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WHICH THEISMS FACE AN
EVIDENTIAL PROBLEM OF EVIL?
Terry Christlieb

Many philosophers simply assume that evil is evidence against a generic form
of theism. Others have tried to offer an argument to show that this is so. I
will argue in Part I that the most promising attempt to develop an argument
of that sort fails. It will become apparent that generic theism is just too
generic to permit anyone to show that known evils provide evidence against
it.
Given the above results I will then in Part II examine the question of
whether some other kind of evidential argument might still be possible. Perhaps an evidential argument from evil could be developed against a properly
elaborated theism, that is, one more precise and detailed in its claims relevant
to the relation of God to evil. But I will argue that it is doubtful that such
can be shown against the really important forms of elaborated theism, namely
those forms to which actual theistic religions are committed. I will point out
a number of grave obstacles to the development of an argument of that sort.
The conclusion will be that there is no adequate basis for the common assumption that evil is evidence against theistic religions.

I
For purposes of explaining and illustrating my position it will be useful to
examine a particular presentation of the evidential argument against generic
theism. I believe that the best development of an argument of this sort is
William L. Rowe's so I will begin by briefly explaining his argument. I will
then show why his argument in particular and this kind of argument in general
cannot succeed.

Rowe's Fawn
Rowe has produced a series of articles in which he attempts to formulate
and defend an "empirical" argument from evil. l The argument is aimed at
what we might call "generic" theism. The generic theist believes that a
unique, omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being exists and created
the universe in which we find ourselves. We will refer to that being as "God."
The evils on which Rowe's argument focuses are, roughly, cases of intense
suffering which have no readily apparent "point" or "purpose." We may
believe that we see why God has allowed some evils, but Rowe wants to calI
attention to cases for which the purpose is not known.
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As an example Rowe constructs the case of a badly burned fawn.2 The evil
of interest is the suffering that the fawn undergoes over a period of several
days before it dies. A number of features of the case are included in order to
block efforts to specify a purpose for this suffering. At the same time, the
goal is to choose a kind of incident which happens, perhaps even on a regular
basis, on our planet.
The fawn's burns result from a forest fire started by lightning. Hence the
suffering is not the result of a free decision of any created being, but instead
has natural causes. Thus, one cannot appeal to the free will defense with
respect to the origin of the suffering. Second, the suffering transpires without
any creaturely moral agent-or perhaps without any other creature at allknowing of it. Hence no one's character is developed by the suffering, no one
has an opportunity to do a good act in response to the suffering, and no one
learns about evil from the suffering. Neither will the fawn profit from the
suffering. For the fawn will never recover, so it cannot have improved itself
by, say, having learned to flee at the first hint of smoke. And fawns presumably do not repent of sins, so the evil could not have been allowed in order
to give the fawn a chance of doing that.
Rowe says of the fawn case:
So far as we can see, the fawn's intense suffering is pointless. For there does
not appear to be any greater good such that the prevention of the fawn's
suffering would require either the loss of that good or the occurrence of an
evil equally bad or worse. Nor does there seem to be any equally bad or worse
evil so connected to the fawn's suffering that it would have had to occur had
the fawn's suffering been prevented. 3

Later, in "Evil and Theodicy," Rowe adds another case for consideration. The
new case is an actual case of the sort one finds with disturbing frequency in
the news, a case in which a child was tortured and then killed. 4 The new case
provides an alternative for those unimpressed by the fawn case. The argument
does not stand or fall on the fawn case (or the other one). Instead, those cases
are offered to help the reader focus on the kind of case that he ought to think
about, those cases of evil for which, try as he may, the reader cannot find a
purpose. The reader can choose his own particular example. As Rowe says in
"The Empirical Argument from Evil," the point is that there exists intense suffering in vast quantities for which we can see no purpose at all, let alone any
purpose unobtainable by omnipotence without that suffering. s
It seems clear that Rowe is developing the case in the way that it must be
developed if it is to succeed. If there is evidence from evil against theism
then surely those cases of evil which we have thought through carefully and
yet have found unexplainable must be part of that evidence. Focusing on
those cases bypasses debate about whether the theist may know the purpose
of the evil. The theist is challenged to begin with the difficult case, the one
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for which she agrees that the purpose of the evil is unknown. So we can agree
with Rowe's claim that his is the strongest sort of evidential argument, the
sort that has the best chance of success. 6 If these cases of evil are not evidence
against theism, then none are.
Here is a summary of Rowe's argument. 7 Let 'E' be used to refer to a case
of evil for which no purpose is known. The fawn or the child torture case
might be it, or, if the reader knows of a case Of evil for which the purpose is
even less apparent than for the ones mentioned, let 'E' stand for that case.
Let' J' be used to refer to whatever property a particular good state of affairs
would have just in case obtaining that good would (morally) justify an omnipotent, omniscient being in permitting E. Let me also note that here and
elsewhere 'good' or 'goods' should be understood as good token(s) rather
than type(s) unless otherwise specified. Then,
1.

We have evidence that all the good states of affairs we know of lack J.

2.

So, we have evidence that every good state of affairs lacks J.

3.

E is a case of a kind found in our world.

4.

Therefore, we have evidence that evils exist which God would not permit
to exist.

5.

Therefore, we have evidence that God does not exist.

The claim is that evil with a certain characteristic-namely the conjunction
of the characteristics of the case supplied for E-is actual and constitutes
evidence that God does not exist. Rowe does not specify how much evidence
there is. Let us assume, at least initially, that only the weakest claim is in
view, so that the argument is only intended to show us some evidence that
God does not exist.
Now clearly there are instances of intense suffering in our world. So far
theist and atheist are agreed. But we must still exercise some caution in our
description of such cases in order to avoid question begging. We cannot
describe such cases as cases of "pointless evil" or "apparently pointless evil,"
for that is certainly not how the cases have seemed to the theist. The theist,
at least before hearing Rowe's argument or one like it, has been thinking of
the cases (if at all) as cases which do have a purpose or at least as cases of
evil which have a purpose of which humans are unaware.
So if there is to be common ground there must first be an acceptable
description of the case, a sufficiently "clinical" description of, say, the fawn
or the child, the injuries, the physical pain, the psychological pain, any pain
caused to others, etc. At a minimum the description must not be in terms of
the actual purposefulness or purposelessness of the evil. Consistent with this
requirement Rowe has focused our attention on the descriptions of the fawn
and the child, descriptions which seem sufficiently "neutral" in the way
indicated. 8
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The Failure of Rowe:S Argument
Can the theist show that the cases mentioned are not evidence against God's
existence? Let us decide by examining the kinds of responses that the theist
might offer. For convenience I will follow Rowe's division of the possible
responses into three groups.9

Option I-Outweigh the Evidence
First, the theist might simply acknowledge that the argument does provide
some evidence against the claim that God exists, but then resist the claim that
God does not exist by piling up other evidence in favor of God's existence.
This other evidence would be such that it "outweighs" the evidence from evil.
Obviously, if the theist takes this option she has accepted the weak claim
that evil is some evidence against God's existence, and so has accepted the
soundness of Rowe's argument as we initially read it. In "The Problem of
Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism" Rowe also suggested that this is the
theist's best response to the evidential problem. But even if she did not
possess favorable evidence the theist would not be without an adequate response to the evidential problem of evil, as we shall see. So having noted
that this response is one of the theist's options we now set it aside, since an
investigation of everything which might be thought of as evidence for or
against God's existence is beyond the scope of this article. 1O

Option 2-Show that the Reasoning Is Unacceptable
The second sort of response is to try to show that somehow the reasoning
goes wrong, that there is an unsupported premise or an illegitimate inference.
In Rowe's opinion this response is a failure, but it seems to me that he has
overlooked some considerations which show his assessment to be unwarrantedly pessimistic. II
Before explaining these considerations I want to introduce a proposition to
which Rowe might appeal for support of premise 1. Although this approach
to supporting premise I has not appeared in Rowe's published works to date,
he did utilize it as means of defending premise 1 in recent correspondence. 12
I will call this proposition premise 'L.'
L. All the goods we know of and which are such that we can tell whether
they have J, lack 1.

Here Rowe countenances the possibility that we may not be able to tell
whether some known goods have J or not. But L also tells us that whenever
we can tell, we always find that they lack J. This offers a reason, he suggests,
for accepting 1. So, besides taking account of what Rowe offers in support
of 1 in his published works, we will also consider this strategy of deriving 1
from a general principle like L.
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We are now prepared to evaluate Option 2 in detail, beginning with premise
L. What does Rowe offer in support of the claim that of all the goods we
know of, either they clearly lack J or we cannot tell whether they have J or
not? Rowe explains that a good that we "know of' is roughly a good that we
conceive of and which we recognize as being intrinsically good. 13 Goods we
don't know of are ones that "include states that are enormously complex, so
complex as to tax our powers of comprehension,"14 or states that contain
"simple properties we have never thought of. .. whose presence ... might render
that state a great intrinsic good. "15 To those we would have to add, presumably, goods we could conceive of, but just have not in fact conceived, for
some reason other than their complexity or their possession of an unusual
simple property, e.g., due to lack of time to spend on conceiving. With that
understood, Rowe's only defense of the premise is, so far as I can tell, an
appeal to the reader to see if he can come up with a good that has J, while
keeping in mind that God is omnipotent and would thus have at His disposal
more potential means of securing any goal than we would.
It is obvious that many of these goods lack J. For when we contemplate them

we see that their value is not high enough (e.g., my enjoyment on smelling
a good cigar) to offset the evils in question. Other goods we know of may
have a great deal of intrinsic value, perhaps even more value than [E has]
disvalue. But here we readily see that an omnipotent, omniscient being could
obtain them without pemlitting [E].16

The reader is invited to go to work and make the same discovery. Does he
really know of some good that God could not obtain without the child's
torture or some equally bad alternative evil being permitted? If so, what
would it be, or what good that we know of would be so important as to make
it permissible?
Has Rowe in this way offered an adequate defense of premise L? I must
admit that I find it persuasive. I may know of great intrinsic goods, even if
I have only a rough understanding of their details, such as "humans dwelling
for eternity in the presence of God." But for that good I do not see exactly
what connection it has with the suffering of the child or the fawn. So although
it may not be true that I "readily see" that God could obtain that good without
E, it is nevertheless true that I do 110t know whether that good has J, and that
is enough to allow L. Or, I may know of some good that certainly does result
from the occurrence of some evil. For example, the mother of a murdered
child may be moved to keep a better watch on her other children, or to start
a program to prevent similar crimes in the future. But even if those goods
are recognizably connected to the child's death, it is, however, not clear that
they have J. It is not clear that they justify the torture and murder, for it is
not clear that they are so good that they outweigh the evil, nor is it clear that
they could not have been obtained in any other way.
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On the other hand some theists would apparently not find this defense of
premise L persuasive. If L is true then the good of human free will lacks J,
or else we can't tell whether it has J. Similarly soul development or human
knowledge-or any of the great goods traditionally mentioned in theodicieswill at best be goods for which we "don't know" whether they have J. But
presumably some of those who give such theodicies believe that they do know
a good that has J. Note here also that anyone who rejects L because they think
that they do know what good has J will for the same reason reject premise 1
even if it is not defended by appeal to L. Others, myself included, would be
willing to grant L while still rejecting 1 for reasons to be explained shortly.
Even the fawn case is not so obviously resistant to treatment by traditional
theodicies as Rowe seems to suppose. It might be claimed, for example, that
God would not let the fawn experience pain if no human came near it. Rowe
might reply that that would be akin to a child's belief that little men come
out from under the bed whenever the child closes his eyes. We have to assume
a certain regularity of phenomena in the natural realm, and just as we do not
posit a host of creatures that emerge only when our eyes are closed, so we
should not assume that animal pain disappears when we are not watching.
But such an appeal to regularity does not really settle the matter in Rowe's
favor. For given the truth of such regularity it is plausible to say that we
actually do know about the fawn's suffering even though we are never there
to see it. Indeed, we could probably bring together an expert on forest fires
and an expert on deer populations and behaviors and have them draw up a
pretty fair estimate of just how many such cases of fawn suffering there will
be in a given time period. Humans, then, are quite aware of this suffering.
Given the similarity of our own bodies to those of higher animals-the animals plausibly thought to be capable of suffering-we even have first hand
experience of all kinds of sufferings that animals face. But if we know all
this, via our recognition of the regularities of nature, then our knowledge of
these facts can play the same role in, say, character development as our
knowledge of the suffering of the person sitting next to us. For example, a
tender-hearted person might be moved by our knowledge of deer suffering in
remote areas to start patrols in the forest to search for wounded animals.
However that may be I wilI waive this concern since, as I said, I find
Rowe's claim compelling. I don't think that I can point out the good that has
J for the candidates for E in question. Those who think that they can will
judge that not even premise L is sufficiently supported.
What of the inference from premise L to I? Since by hypothesis we do not
know whether the other known goods have J, how can we infer that they
don't? I know of no statement by Rowe on this particular inference. But it
looks as though it is unacceptable as I now intend to show.
First, to simplify the discussion I will assume that there are only a finite
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number of particular goods; a very great finite number, no doubt, but still
only finite. Even if that assumption is false it will not change the point I want
to make. In accord with the simplifying assumption, then, we might respond
to the inference in this way: the strength of the inference from L to 1 will
depend on what percentage of the particular goods we know of are goods for
which we can determine whether or not they have J with respect to some E.
If we knew of 1000 goods and we could tell for only 5 of them whether they
had J, then even if none of the 5 had J that fact would be a shaky ground for
proposition 1. After all, only a single good may justify the permission of
every case of evil in the actual world, and in the situation just described 99.5%
of the known goods still would not be eliminated from contention for that
role.
This criticism if successful shows that if 1 is based on L, the "evidence"
mentioned in 1 is for all we have been shown only very weak evidence. So
it will be easily outweighed if there is any evidence on the other side. But
the criticism does not defeat Rowe's argument as we read it, for it does not
show that E provides no evidence at all against God's existence.
But perhaps Rowe could argue that the percentage is in fact rather high.
He might argue that there have never been more than a few candidates for
the J-good-things like the moral freedom of creatures. At the same time we
know of all manner of goods-the smell of a pine tree, the warmth of a fire,
etc.-that they lack J. And this response is forceful, given that we are so far
only discussing goods we "know of." Hence the first criticism will not even
show us that the evidence generated by E would be minimal, let alone that it
would generate none at all. But that brings us to a more important criticism
of the L to 1 inference.
To see this second criticism, we must remember that these are by hypothesis
known goods, which means that if we have decided that we can't tell whether
one of them has J, we have done so after "examining" or "considering" the
good. We have found nothing about it to convince us that it has J and nothing
to rule out its having J either. By hypothesis, we would need more information
of some sort in order to make a decision about the possession of J by any of
these goods. Now suppose that you are in a store looking at neckties. You
want one that will match a sport coat that is at home. Ninety of them, you
are sure, do not match the coat. But for ten of them you just can't tell. Do
you then have evidence that none of the ties match the coat? Surely the answer
is "no." Instead you have evidence that ninety of them don't and that there
are ten for which you have no evidence regarding whether they match the
coat. If this situation is analogous to the case of interest-and it seems that
it is-then Rowe's inference is unwarranted. It is not true that we have
evidence that all the good states of affairs that we know of lack J. Knowing
whether a particular good has J requires a sort of "matching" or "comparison"
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of that good with a particular E. In the case of the neckties, we just couldn't
decide about some of them because the sport coat was not there, and the
decision depended on detailed information about the tie-coat relation. In the
same way we can't tell about some goods without a more detailed "look" at
the relationship between the particular good and E. It makes no difference
that we can quickly rule out some of the goods without having a more detailed
look. So the inference from L to I is unwarranted.
Since we cannot infer 1 from L, is there some other way for Rowe to support
I? The only other defense of it offered by him is given in capsule form in
the excerpt from "Evil and Theodicy" quoted earlier. We will have to contemplate all the goods we know of, and, for everyone of them, we will
"readily see" that they do not possess J.17 This is just not an adequate defense
of such a sweeping claim. For great goods like moral freedom, salvation from
hell, the existence of the actual world, and others this claim does not seem
obviously true. Rowe will have to do more than just assert that we will "see"
that it is so, for I for one do not see it. And agreeing as I do that we do not
know which good has J for, say, the fawn case does not establish 1, even
though it does establish L to my satisfaction.
Thus this second line of criticism accomplishes what the first could not. It
shows that we do not have reason to accept premise 1. As a result, unless
some way of supporting premise 2 other than by appeal to 1 can be found,
there will be no reason to hold that E is any evidence at all against God's
existence.
But even though none has been given, suppose that some good reason to
accept 1 could be found. Would the inference from premise 1 to 2 be acceptable? It seems to me that it would be OK. But at the same time we cannot
suppose that 1 provides more than minimal evidence for the claim that all
goods lack J (i.e., for 2). Only if in addition to 1 we could be confident that
the goods we know of, as a percentage of all goods, known and unknown, is
rather high, or alternatively, that the goods we know of are a representative
sample of all goods '8 , could the evidence be shown to be more than minimal.
But neither of those additional items can be shown. For given what Rowe
(rightly) acknowledges-that we have reason to suppose that there are goods
of which we know not-how could we hope to estimate how many of those
unknown goods there are? And if we do not have a handle on that, how could
we assess how the number of known goods compares with the total number?
We couldn't. Similarly, since the unknown goods are unknown, it is hard to
see how we could become confident that the class of known goods is representative of the class of all goods.
So, yes, the inference from 1 to 2 is acceptable and it shows at most that
there is some weak evidence that all goods lack J if 1 is true. But in fact there
is, as we have seen, no reason to accept that 1 is true. So 2 is unsupported.
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Is there some other way to support 2? Bruce Russell has recently argued
that anyone who does not know the point of a particular evil has evidence
against God's existence. 19 If he is right then premise 2 must be OK. Russell
appeals to a hypothetical example to make his case. A skilled doctor is visiting
a Stone Age tribe and determines that a young man needs his appendix
removed at once. The tribesmen know nothing of surgery and have never seen
anyone survive a wound to the abdomen of the size that would be needed.
The father does not see the point of the evil of cutting the abdomen and so
is rational in believing that the doctor, despite his promise of help, is either
ignorant or malevolent. In the same way, says Russell, if we know of any
"apparently pointless" evil, then we have evidence that God does not exist.
This is true, he suggests, of "everyone" who does not know the point of an
evil. 20
To see why this is incorrect first note that premise 2 would certainly follow
from something like
Rs: We know that all goods lack J.

But if we think carefully about the case, it is clear that we have no reason to
think that the father has a basis for holding something like Rs when he finds
the operation "apparently pointless." Instead, his experience supports only a
claim like L (discussed earlier) or perhaps only a claim even weaker than L
like
Rw: We do not know the good that has J.

Obviously if the example will only support L, it is of no help in supporting
2 if 2 cannot be derived from L via 1.
The situation that confronts the tribal father supports only proposition Lor
some weaker claim. This helps us see a crucial point: it is not simply the
"appearing" that dictates the father's conclusion that the doctor is either
malevolent or ignorant. Other factors come into play. In particular, he must
be sufficiently confident that his judgment in this area is better than that of
the doctor. In the case as Russell has described it, the father knows little or
nothing about the doctor and presumably is also confident of his own knowledge of the world and his own ability to make good decisions. But the case
might have been otherwise.
For example suppose, not implausibly, that cases of "sudden pain on this
side of the belly" are recognized by the tribe as usualIy fatal and beyond the
powers of the local shaman to counter. With little confidence about his own
understanding of the phenomenon this father, or some other tribesman, might
be inclined to let the doctor go ahead with the operation even though they
don't see the point of what the doctor is proposing to do. And it seems to me
that they would be rational in doing so.
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Just because the doctor has made a suggestion (to cut the boy open) which
the father considers unusual or peculiar does not mean that the father must
immediately lower his opinion of the doctor's intelligence or goodness. He
does not have to change his opinion even initially. Anyone who has ever
learned anything from any sort of teacher must have had the experience of
hearing that teacher utter something which seemed unusual or surprising. We
do not need to suppose that when we hear the surprising remark we always
lower our opinion of the intelligence of the teacher, not even initially.
The point is that it is not inevitable that our failure to see a particular point
for a particular evil means that that evil is evidence against God's intelligence
or benevolence. I conclude that the truth of premise 2 is not supported by the
means proposed by Russell either.
Thus, there is much more to this second line of response than Rowe thought.
The problem does not even look as though it can be corrected, for that would
require obtaining information that we have no way of obtaining. That is, we
would need information about the presumably vast number of unknown goods
and their relationships to the candidate for E. As a result, it will not be
possible to show that there is evidence that no good has J for the given E.
And if it can't be shown that there is evidence that no good has J, then it
won't be possible to show that E is evidence that God does not exist via this
argument. Moreover, if, as seems to be the case, this is the strongest version
of the evidential argument against generic theism, then we have reason to
believe that it wiII not be possible to show by any argument that evil is
evidence against generic theism.

Option 3- "Defeat" the Argument
The strategy in the case of the third response discussed by Rowe is to
attempt to "defeat" the support for the conclusion. 21 Evidence is not acknowledged but then "outweighed" by some other line of evidence, as in the first.
response, and it is not rendered ineffective by showing that there has been
an error in reasoning as in the second response, but instead it is "defeated"
by bringing forward some additional information which when added to our
original information dissolves the support it seemed to provide.
The alleged evidence would be defeated, for example, by offering some
reason to believe that we should expect the good that has J with respect to
some evil, if it exists at all, to be among the goods we know of but cannot
tell whether they have J or else among the goods of which we do not know.
If this could be shown then premise 2 would be unsupported and the argument
would fail.
Is there any reason to expect the good that has J to be in either of the
categories just mentioned, given the confines of generic theism? Here is one
line of argument for such a conclusion. God is infinitely good, so we could
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expect Him to pursue very great goods. Goods that we know of are sometimes
greater because they are more complex, so we can expect that there would
be very great goods that are very complex. If it would take a very great good
to justify the evil that occurs in case E, then we might expect that good to
be a very complex one. Since humans can only conceive states of affairs of
limited complexity, we have reason to suppose that the J-good would be
among those states of affairs we cannot conceive and hence do not know of.22
I find this line of thought a plausible one, but I will not pursue a defense
of it here. If it is sound then we have yet another reason to suppose that
Rowe's argument fails to show that evil is evidence against theism. If the line
of thought just outlined is not sound then the support for Rowe's conclusion
remains undefeated.
Reflection on this third option does, however, show once again that the
evidence provided for the claim that God does not exist will be at best
minimal. For if we have reason to believe that the good that has J is just as
likely to be among those goods we don't know of as among those we do know
of, and if there is no reason to suppose that we know of more than a tiny
percentage of all goods, then the evidence that all goods lack J will be small.
And given the strictly limited capacities of human intelligence, there is no
reason to think that we would know of more than a tiny percentage of all
goods. And surely the J-good is just as likely to be in one group or the other
unless there is reason to suppose that we humans would be particularly attuned to that good, unless, that is, there is reason to suppose that there would
be some special connection between our faculties of understanding and that
good. But why should there be such a connection?
This last point is more readily seen if we keep in mind the distinction
between generic and elaborated forms of theism. In our culture any discussion
of theism and evil is likely to attract the unconscious importation of the
doctrines of some particular form of theism, and especially doctrines from
the "Judeo-Christian" tradition. Rowe himself called attention to this in responding to Wykstra. 23 Rowe utilized such a distinction, calling generic theism 'restricted standard theism' ('RST') and any elaborated version an
'expanded standard theism' ('EST'). RST involves only the claims that God
exists and is omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent and creator of this
universe. ESTs are RST plus "certain other significant religious claims."24
Traditional Judeo-Christian theism is thus an EST.
Now within that tradition it is true that humans are quite special and that
God has some willingness to let them know what is going on in the universe.
So, it might then be expected that God would make sure that humans know
about the good that has J for some particular case of evil, and that might be
reason to suppose that it is less likely that it would be among those goods we
do not know about. But given a really generic theism, one as generic as the
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one Rowe's argument attacks, the J-good would be just as likely to be among
those goods we don't know. Nothing in generic theism demands that humans
be privy to these matters. So, this third line of response at least shows that
we have no reason to suppose that E provides very much evidence against
God's existence, and it may show more if the argument to show that the
J-good would be beyond our grasp has any force.

Summary of Part I
We looked at three options for a reply to Rowe's argument. The first option
simply granted the claim that evil is some evidence, and for that reason cannot
undercut Rowe's argument when read as the weak claim that a particular evil
is some evidence against generic theism. Study of the third option shows that
we have no reason to think that the evidence generated by any E would be
more than minimal, but also suggested a line of argument which, if it proves
sound, would show that E does not generate any evidence against theism. The
second option, which questioned the reasoning employed in the argument,
established that Rowe's argument fails to show that evil is evidence against
theism, and that the failure apparently cannot be remedied.
Moreover, we have found support for the claim that evil is not any evidence
at all against (generic) theism. For 1) Rowe offers a very strong presentation
of the case for treating evil as evidence against theism, 2) the case was
examined for its success at merely providing some evidence that God does
not exist, and 3) the case was shown to fail in ways that appear impossible
to patch up.
Is the outcome we have discovered just a result of relying on Rowe s
evidential argument? I do not think that the outcome would be different for
other evidential arguments. As I mentioned earlier, Rowe suggests that the sort
of argument that he has given is the "strongest" sort of argument from evil. His
fawn case is specially crafted so as to yield an argument resistant to theistic
rejoinders. It is meant to block attempts to show that there is a J-good for the
evil described. So we have reason to think that we have not merely offered the
theistic response to an anemic fonn of the evidential argument.
But could it really be that evil is not evidence against theism? I submit that
the foregoing arguments are reason to think that it is not evidence against
generic theism, despite what is often said. I will next try to explain what
remains to be done if anyone is to show that evil is evidence against theism
in some other sense.
II

The Possibility of an Evidential Argument
Generic theism is simply too generic to be susceptible to an evidential
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attack. Unless the set of propositions that constitutes generic theism is somehow supplemented, its relation to propositions about the evils of this world
will remain obscure. It wiIl certainly be too obscure to justify the claim that
a significant evidential relation exists between them.
Why did Rowe aim the argument at generic theism in the first place, given
that he recognized the existence of elaborated versions of theism? After all,
the expanded forms of theism predale the restricted form. Moreover, it is the
expanded forms that constitute religious belief systems. So far as I know,
there are few, if any, religious groups whose theology consists of only RST.
Presumably Rowe has simply inherited this minimal "restricted version" of
"Jheism" from earlier, now discredited, attempts to stick theism with a logical
problem of evil. The idea was to ignore all irrelevant elements of theism,
attending to only those which would be needed to yield the alleged internal
contradiction.
It now appears that dealing with generic theism does not bring the issue
into sufficiently sharp focus. Or, if it does, then we must conclude that there
is no real problem of evil. For it is now generaIly conceded, as Rowe himself
concedes, that there is no logical inconsistency in holding that evil exists and
that generic theism is true. In the face of that result Rowe's argument, in
effect, tries to salvage matters for the atheologian via a minimal withdrawal,
i.e., by claiming that evil is at least evidence against generic theism. As we
have seen, that claim is false. So, either there is no good argument from evil
against theism, or, if there is it wilI be an as yet unformulated argument
directed at an elaborated theism. It becomes important, then, to be clear about
the notion of an "elaborated theism."

Elaborated Theisms
Showing that evil is evidence against theism means showing that evil is
evidence against some elaborated theism. Not just any sort of elaboration
will do. It will have to be an elaboration which provides more details about
the relationship held to exist between God and evil. It seems clear that propositions with content of at least three different sorts must be added. First,
propositions about God's "plans"; second, propositions about the nature of
the creation and the experiences of the creatures that inhabit it; and third,
propositions about what is and is not valuable.
"Plan" propositions would be about God's goals and intentions for the
creation, including his plans for achieving those goals. For example, "God is
attempting to produce a hedonistic utopia" would be such a proposition. We
need more detail about why God created what He did or about why He created
at all if we are to assess whether what we see in the creation is evidence that
He does not exist.
Second, we need more detail about just what it is that we see in the creation.
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Propositions about the nature of creation would be ones like "Dogs have free
will" or "Ceteris paribus, higher intelligence intensifies pain experiences."
Propositions about the history of the universe might be required as well.
Again, evaluating His plans for achieving His goals would require an understanding of what possibilities for achieving such goals might exist. In any
case there wi11 have to be further details about the nature of the created world,
something well beyond the claims that it was created by God and that it
contains evil E. Propositions about value would be ones like "Free will is
valuable" or "The same moral standards apply to both God and man." We
need to be clear about the theist's basis for evaluating the creation and the
purposes of God.
Next we must ask how such propositions come to be added to generic
theism. There are several different routes by which materials for an elaboration could be added to the generic view. It is important to distinguish these
because they are not all equally useful, given the goal of developing an
interesting evidential argument from evil. Generic theism might be "elaborated" through I) supplementation by "neutral" propositions, 2) adoption of
a "given" elaboration, or 3) introduction of a "speculative" elaboration. Any
combination of the above options could also occur.
The first route is intended to cover elaboration that is "neutral" in the sense
that both parties to the discussion-both theist and atheist-are committed
to the truth of the additional propositions. An example of neutral elaboration
would be the addition of propositions about various empirical findings to
generic theism. There may be controversy about what has or has not been
found empirically at times, but there is no reason to think that atheists could
never, say, point out important research findings with which the theist might
also agree (or vice versa). For example, if scientists were somehow able to
show conclusively that there is an upper limit on how much pain a fawn
experiences when burned, that might have some bearing on the debate. The
theist might want to "elaborate" her position by pointing out this finding.
But theism may also be elaborated through the addition of propositions that
are not neutral. One way involves adoption of a "given" elaboration. By a
"given" elaboration, I mean an elaboration of generic theism as found in an
established religious tradition. Some given elaborations will predate the specification of generic theism, but they need not. Usually they will have arisen
independently of any concern with generic theism in and of itself. What is
most important about a given elaboration, however, is that at least some
theists will be committed to the truth of that elaboration in the same way and
to roughly the same degree that they are committed to the truth of generic
theism. It will be for them a non-negotiable elaboration. There are, in this
way, "ready made" elaborations of theism around, which in an important way
are prior to generic theism or even arguments from evil.
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What counts as a "given" elaboration? There is no room to treat the answer
in any detail here. To offer only one example, there are some Christians who
take the Bible, and perhaps especially the New Testament, as containing the
elaboration of theism which is given and to which they are thus committed.
But even then there would of course be varied schools of interpretation to
contend with.
In contrast, one might concoct a "designer" theism, one which is not a
neutral elaboration of generic theism and which also does not closely match
any given theism. Let us call these "speculative" elaborations. Perhaps if, as
some have suggested, Spinoza ought to be counted as a theist, his views
would be an example of a speculative theism. There may be controversy about
whether a certain elaboration is given or speculative, but I think that we can
recognize at least a rough distinction here. In any case neither a given nor a
speculative elaboration need include only propositions that the atheist agrees
are true.
lt sometimes happens that speculative elements are added to a given elaboration. To return to our previous illustration, Christians who take the Bible
itself to be the only given elaboration might count a fully developed doctrine
of the Trinity as a speculative elaboration. But other Christians may see a
fully developed doctrine of the Trinity as a part of given elaboration.
So we may recognize various ways of elaborating generic theism: neutral
elaboration, given elaboration, speculative elaboration, and various combinations of these. These distinctions might be further refined but perhaps this is
now adequate to allow the claim which follows to be understood. I want to
claim that an evidential argument must be shown for an elaboration that
includes a given elaboration if it is to be of real interest. For, as we have seen,
arguments (like Rowe's) that are aimed against a generic theism or a generic
theism with only neutral elaboration fail. 25 And, on the other hand, launching
an argument against a merely speculative elaboration (or again a merely
neutral elaboration) risks failing to come to grips with the real concern. Since
it would not show that evil is evidence against an actual theistic religion,
with real adherents who are committed to the truth of its doctrines, it will
only be a preliminary exercise.

Prospects for Success
Since it is an evidential argument against some given elaboration of theism
that is needed, it should next be clear that we cannot assume, from the outset,
that a successful evidential argument against a particular given elaboration
can be produced. It has not been shown that evil is evidence against generic
theism, so there is no presumption for the claim that evil counts against given
theisms. One must then accept the challenge of showing that it is evidence
against a given elaborated theism if one hopes to show that there is an
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evidential problem. I would like to suggest that there is little prospect for
success.
The reason is that even given elaborations still appear to be too general
with respect to what they say about evil to allow the formulation of an
evidential case. As a result the outcome will be similar to that for Rowe's
argument against generic theism. Moreover, there is no advance guarantee
that an honest attempt to elaborate one of the given elaborations even further
(via introducing neutral and/or speculative elaboration) would yield materials
sufficient for an evidential argument.
To see this, (for purposes of illustration) assume that the Bible is the source
of our given elaboration. Then consider the sorts of propositions that we said
would be needed for an elaboration to become open to an evidential argument
from evil. "Plan" propositions were one sort. The Bible does contain statements about God's plans. He plans to bring Israel out of Egypt, to have
Solomon build His temple, to have the Gentiles hear the gospel, and so on.
But one will certainly look in vain for a detailed discussion of all of His plans
or even for a systematic outline of all the main projects. Even the leaders of
His people are caught off guard. The Jewish leaders are surprised by the
Messiah's behavior and the Christian leaders, including Peter, are surprised
to find that the Gentiles are also going to receive grace. And if we need to
know more in this area in order to decide whether evil is evidence we may
have a long wait. We cannot really plan on gaining details about God's plans
beyond those offered in the particular given elaboration under consideration.
We have no way of reading God's mind.
Moreover, the Bible not only lacks details of the sort needed, but even
contains passages which positively affirm that humans do not have the necessary information nor the wherewithal to obtain it. For example in Romans
11 :33 Paul writes of God's wisdom and says "how unsearchable his judgments, and his paths beyond tracing out." This theme is actually rather prominent in the Bible. 26
As regards propositions about the nature of creation, if the Bible is the
given elaboration then it offers very little in this category. What it does offer
is mostly about humans and their experiences. It does not offer treatises on
all of the modem fields of research. Moreover, even if we added scientific
findings about the creation (as neutral elaboration) to our given elaboration,
a little reflection on the speculations of cosmological theorizing, the counterintuitive deliverances of quantum mechanics, the struggle to understand our
own consciousness and similar cases are enough to show the difficulty of
attaining a full picture here. This is especially clear when we consider the
history of the universe as a whole. Since the role of one evil may only be
clear in the context of the role of others, it may prove important to have the
whole picture if the goal is to trace out the reasons for evil.
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Moreover, even if we did know what all of the goods and evils are, there
is no guarantee that we would have the intellectual capacity to begin tracing
out the interconnections among them to see whether or not all of the evils
were really unavoidable. That this difficulty exists is not merely a doctrine
of theism. It is a simple matter of empirical fact that human thinkers are quite
limited in memory, ability to consider a large number of facts at one time,
etc.
Finally, the Bible would certainly be a much richer source of elaboration
with regard to values-the third sort of proposition-than with regard to the
other two categories. But even then not all of the questions about values that
seem to be relevant to this issue are answered in the Bible. There is, for
example, no careful, systematic discussion of whether (and if so how) the
differences between God and His creatures affect what it is or is not allowable
for Him to do as opposed to what they can allowably do.
So, it seems probable that this very well-known given elaboration of theism
would not be sufficiently detailed to allow the desired evidential argument
from evil. I would have to say a lot more about even this one elaboration to
fully secure the claim that it is not sufficiently detailed to make an evidential
problem possible, but I think that I have said enough to make the claim
plausible to many who have thought about these matters. I now want to
mention two other important points, ones not limited to the evaluation of any
particular given elaboration.
First, it might turn out that there are several given elaborations of theism
with respect to evil. Theists presumably do not have to agree about everything, and this may be an area where there is not uniformity. So, even if an
evidential argument can be shown to be available against one of these, there
may not be one available against the other. This possibility is unavoidable so
long as a variety of elaborations exist. Of course, even showing that one given
elaboration is subject to an evidential objection might be useful in a sense,
but it might not be useful for the establishment of atheism. It might simply
have the effect of showing theists what some of the better theistic options
are. 27
Second, it could happen that when a sufficiently detailed elaboration is
specified, we will find that evil is evidence in favor of theism rather than
evidence against it. For if the elaboration should somehow show a) that there
is some particular goal that God-consistent with His attributes-would certainly pursue, and b) that attaining that goal would necessitate allowing the
evils that we find, then the evil in the world would provide strong confirmation of God's existence. 28
So the task of finding an evidential argument from evil against theism is
formidable, and there is no guarantee that the atheist would be pleased with
the outcome. But once again it must be recognized that carrying out that task
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is what is ultimately necessary if one wants to show-and not merely assertthat evil is evidence against theism. It is unreasonable simply to assume that
it is, especially in light of the failure to show that evil is evidence against
generic theism. 29
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